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THE AFTERMATH OF DOE v.
COMMONWEALTH'S ATTORNEY: IN SEARCH
OF THE RIGHT TO BE LET ALONE
Steven 0. Ludd*
I.

INTRODUCTION

If there is one principle of American government which has survived the currents of history it is the sanctity of a citizen's right to be
free from unwarranted governmental intervention. Indeed, some have
suggested that the most important seed which spawned this country's
movement for independence was the colonists' commitment to the acquisition of individual liberty. 1 The revolutionary vision of maximizing
individual liberty did not meet the fate of extinction as the concluding
thesis of a political philosophical treatise. Instead, it provided, as John
Adams wrote, the "stamina vitae" for a constitution of government., It,
therefore, seems incredulous that many Americans remain the potential
targets of the most unconscionable form of governmental invasion conceivable-the placing of criminal sanctions on private, adult, consen-

sual sexual behavior.3
While some states have chosen to criminalize forms of heterosexual activity, most states which place criminal sanctions on sexual conduct have directed their legislative enactments toward homosexual behavior. 4 The United States Supreme Court's summary affirmance of
Virginia's criminal sodomy statute as applied to private, adult, consensual, homosexual behavior in Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney5 was a
devastating blow to all Americans who are concerned with the most
cherished right of all civilized men-"the right to be let alone." 6
The Court's denial of a discretionary appeal, of course, may be, as
some lower courts have suggested, insufficient legal precedent to signal
* Associate Professor of Political Science, Bowling Green State University. A.B., Syracuse
University (1968); J.D., Syracuse University (1972); Ph.D., Syracuse University (1976). Member,
Ohio Bar.
I. See, e.g., B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1967).
2. THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 478-79 (C. Adams ed. 1850).
3. See generally C. FORD & F. BEACH, PATTERNS OF SEXUAL BEHAVIOR (1951); B. MACEL,
ONE IN TWENTY: A STUDY OF HOMOSEXUALITY (1966); J.MARMOR, SEXUAL INVERSION (1965).
4. For an excellent overview of state statutes which prohibit private, adult, consensual, homosexual acts, see Rivera, Our Straight-Laced Judges: The Legal Position of Homosexual Persons in the United States, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 799, 949-51 (1979).
5. 425 U.S. 901 (1976), affig mem., 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975).
6. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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a firm federal standard providing irrefutable constitutional legitimacy
to state intrusion into the sanctity of consensual sexual relations between adults. 7 But many judges and legal authorities disagree.' Depending upon state statutes and the jurisprudential tenets to which
each state or lower federal court judge subscribes, dramatically different judicial rationales have been enunciated in an effort to determine
the constitutional implications of Doe."
The most important task of this article is to identify the various
judicial attitudes concerning private, adult, consensual, homosexual behavior which have emerged since Doe and evaluate the constitutionality
of these lower court determinations. To accomplish this objective it will
be necessary to examine briefly the philosophical and historical origins
of what some have described as the constitutional right of privacy.
From this excursion into the matrix of constitutional priorities, the investigation will turn to contemporary United States Supreme Court decisions which have addressed the fundamentality of individual self-determination. Finally, after a firm understanding of our past
constitutional commitments has been established, the current judicial
inconsistencies will be analyzed in light of the federal district court's
opinion that was subsequently affirmed by the Supreme Court in Doe.
II.

INDIVIDUAL AUTONOMY-EARLY AMERICAN VISIONS

In this society of mass technology, large and seemingly faceless
government and corporate bureaucracies, and communication systems
which homogenize Americans into prepackaged consumer marketing
ventures, we too often have to literally force ourselves to focus upon our
individuality. Most Americans however, have become adept at devising
their own methods for this inward search for meaning. Our quest for
self-awareness is derived from a uniquely American reverence for personal autonomy and individual liberty. The philosophical roots of this
important value can be traced to a myriad of political philosophers
across the continuum of modern history.1 ° Indeed, our constitutional
system is an amalgam of various seventeenth and eighteenth century
political and philosophical epistemologies. But if there was one current
of political thought which captured the hearts and minds of colonial

7. People v. Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981).
8. See infra note 241 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 163-270 and accompanying text.
10. See generally THE ENGLISH LIBERTARIAN HERITAGE (D. Jacobsen ed. 1965) [hereinafter cited as JACOBSEN]; J. LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (2d ed. London 1967); J.
MILL, ON LIBERTY (1980); G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC (1969); THE
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON (G. Hunt ed. 1960) [hereinafter cited as MADISON].
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Americans it was English libertarianism.1"
The radical Whig tradition of early eighteenth century England
that "Americans found most attractive, most relevant to their situation
and needs," 12 can be understood generally through the writings of John
Trenchard and Thomas Gordon. 3 Of particular interest to this investigation is their vision of what constituted the legitimate aim of government. Trenchard and Gordon urged that government was but a practical restraint, and that the role of free government was to protect the
people in their liberties. 4 Government was not to be concerned "with
the private Thoughts and Actions of Men."' 5 For the English libertarians and for many colonial Americans, government was not "to direct
them in their own Affairs, in which no one is interested but themselves."1 " But more specifically, they wrote of liberty and government:
And it is foolish to say, that Government is concerned to meddle with the
private Thoughts and Actions of Men, while they injure neither the Society, nor any of its Members. Every Man is, in Nature and Reason, the
Judge and Disposer of his own domestic Affairs; and, according to the
Rules of Religion and Equity, every Man must carry his own Conscience. So that neither has the Magistrate .. .or any body else, any
manner of Power to model People's Speculations, no more than their
Dreams. Government being intended to protect Men from the injuries of
one another, and not to direct them in their own Affairs, in which no one
is interested but themselves; it is plain, that their Thoughts and domestic
Concerns are exempted intirely from its Jurisdiction. 17
Ultimately, Trenchard and Gordon concluded that "[t]his Passion
for Liberty in Men, and their Possession of it, is of that Efficacy and
Importance, that it seems the Parent of all Virtues."1 8 Therefore, the
attainment and protection of liberty was not only believed to be the
highest aspirational goal of government, but it was also the progenitor
of other values necessary in a society committed to maximizing the
human potential. Without the freedom to "judge" and be the "dis-

See generally B. BAILYN, supra note 1, at 36; G. WOOD, supra note 10, at 49. See also
(1965).
B. BAILYN, supra note 1, at 36.
13. See G. WOOD. supra note 10, at 50; Trenchard & Gordon, Cato's Letters in the Independent Whig, in JACOBSEN, supra note 10. The writings of Trenchard and Gordon have come to
be known as "Cato's Letters" because the signature attached to each essay published in The
London Journal in 1720 was "Cato," representing the Roman spokesman of liberty. B. BAILYN,
supra note 1,at 36.
14. JACOBSEN, supra note 10, at 127, 129.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 131.
II.

B.

BAILYN. PAMPHLETS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
12. See G. WOOD, supra note 10, at 15. See also
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poser" of one's "domestic affairs" and to "carry [one's] own conscience," government has failed. Nevertheless, neither the libertarians
nor the colonialists believed that individual liberty was an absolute and
unqualified right. 9
Trenchard and Gordon placed an important condition upon the
citizen's right to personal autonomy. The "private Thoughts and Actions of Men," were not to be interfered with by government "while
°
they injure neither the Society, nor any of its Members."" The litmus
test of the legitimate parameters of individual behavior and the corresponding obligation of government may be described as the harm
factor.
There are two implicit yet clear presumptions interwoven into their
vision of the appropriate relationship between a free society and its
government. The first is that it is the burden of government to demonstrate that harm has been or will be the resultant effect of an individual's behavior. The basis, of course, of this claim is that the autonomy
of the individual is to be exalted as a first priority for legitimate government. The limitation of liberty can be justified only as an exception
to the general principle of governmental nonintervention. The second
presumption is that for government to carry its burden it must demonstrate that society or one of its members is injured. Obviously, this is a
fact question. Therefore, before government's heavy burden of proof
can be met to justify limiting individual behavior, it must demonstrate
empirically that an individual citizen is harmed by the behavior or that
the collective as a whole is somehow injured. This harm calculator
which depicts a strong mutuality of respect between the citizen's personal autonomy and the majoritarian interest was accepted with enthusiasm by colonial Americans and has been subsequently incorporated
within our jurisprudential system."
James Madison, one of the most influential draftsmen of the Constitution and a fervent supporter of majoritarian government, cautioned
his colleagues to design structural safeguards within the governmental
process to guard against abuses of power originating from the collective
people. He wrote that:
In our governments the real power lies in the majority of the community,
and the invasion of private rights is chiefly to be apprehended, not from
acts of government contrary to the sense of its constituents, but from

19.
20.
21.

Id. at 129.
Id.
See B.

BAILYN,

supra note 1, at 36; see also Letters from a Pennsylvania Farmer, in
343 (P.L. Ford ed. 1895).

THE WRITINGS OF JOHN DICKINSON
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acts in which the government is the mere instrument of the majority
22

As a staunch proponent of majoritarian government, Madison was
not suggesting that government ought not be responsive to the collective will. Yet, his understanding of government was tempered by the
eighteenth century concern for the sanctity of individual liberty. 23 To
protect the private rights of citizens who may not possess majoritarian
political power, Madison warned that Americans must understand the
important distinction between "popular" majoritarian and "constitutional" majoritarian government. He reminded his associates that
"[t]he majority, as formed by the Constitution, may be a minority
when compared with the popular majority.""' As long as the Constitution was operative, the only legitimate source of governmental action
was derived from those citizens who accepted the values expressed by
it-even if on occasion constitutional rule was not reflective of popular
opinion.2 5

22. See MADISON, supra note 10, at 272.
23. See MADISON, supra note 10, at 523. Madison wrote the following:
It has been said that all government is evil. It would be more proper to say that the necessity of any government is a misfortune. This necessity however exists; and the problem to
be solved is,
not what form of government is perfect, but which form is least imperfect; and
here the general question must be between a republican government in which a lesser number or the least number rule the majority. If the republican form is, as all of us agree, to be
preferred, the final question must be, what is the structure of it that will best guard against
precipitate counsels and factious combinations for unjust purposes, without a sacrifice of
the fundamental principles of republicanism. Those who denounce majority governments
altogether because they may have interest in abusing their power, denounce at the same
time all republican government and must maintain that minority governments would feel
less of the bias of interest or the seductions of power.
Id.
24. Id. at 527.
25. Id. Madison understood that the protection of minority rights could not be totally dependent upon simple calculations of popular opinions. The "popular majority" represented the
collective opinions or interests of the largest numerical combination of Americans. In contemporary terminology Madison's "popular majority" might be analogous to 51% of those citizens who
responded similarly to a Harris or Gallup type poll. The "constitutional majority," while not mutually distinct from the "popular majority," was (is) limited in its composition to those individuals
whose desires and interests generally reflect the expressed and implicit goals of the Constitution. It
was this body of citizens which Madison argued would fulfill the purposes of democratic republican government.
He was well aware that the "constitutional majority," on some occasions, would be a "popular minority." The primary task of the constitutionally established departments of government-particularly, the Supreme Court-was to gain, and subsequently maintain, the confidence
of the "constitutional majority." For inclusion in this group one needed more than simply an
opinion. American constitutional government could not survive, let alone attain its aspirational
objectives, without a tacit commitment to the securing of basic human freedoms through compromise and tolerance. Therefore, compliance which was engendered by bias or prejudice-even if it
reflected a popular majority of Americans-could not provide the basis for Supreme Court action
or inaction.
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For Madison, majority rule, in the context of constitutional government, was not a mere calculation of current popular opinion. With
an eye toward the dangers of legislative assemblies simply carrying out
the desires of popular whim regardless of constitutional mandates, he
urged that while majoritarian government was to be preferred over any
system which was grounded upon the minority ruling the majority, our
new governmental experiment could survive only if a constant evalua6
tion of the basis for majoritarian governmental action was instituted.
Madison realized that without strict adherence to constitutional purposes there would be little difference between majoritarianism and totalitarianism.2 7 Opinion alone was insufficient to provide legitimacy to
8
legislative enactments which impinged upon the'rights of individuals.
His insistence on strong separations of power in government and conformity to constitutional purposes was a reflection of the Founders' vision which perceived government as a mechanism by which each individual could obtain a maximum of liberty and a minimum of
suppression.2 9 Hence, majoritarian opinion which rejected this aspirational objective of our constitutional democracy with a limited government could not provide a legitimate basis for governmental action.
This fear of majoritarian abuse of power and the equating of popular approval of legislation with constitutional validation was eloquently expressed by Thomas Cooley in 1873. In Joseph Story's Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, Cooley wrote:
[NIor are laws necessarily equal and just because professedly they act
upon all alike. A general law may establish regulations upon subjects not
properly falling within the province of government, and yet be desired
and cheerfully submitted to by the majority, who might be inclined,
under any circumstances, voluntarily to establish such regulations for
Professor Archibald Cox has identified subdivisions of American society whose support is sine
que non for a minimum level of voluntary compliance when, in Madison's terminology, the "popular majority" outnumbers the "constitutional majority." He suggests that on those "great occasions" when the Supreme Court may activate its power of judicial interpretation of the vague
constitutional boundaries, it must generate acceptance from the political branches of government,
the rest of the legal profession, and enough of the public. See A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME
COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 105 (1976).
Whether the Court should look to only this population to be forewarned as to the probability
of compliance with its decisions, or, more importantly, should look to compliance as the only
criterion for constitutional decision making, is another question.
26. See generally MADISON, supra note 10.
27. See supra note 23.
28. See, e.g., C. ROSSITER, THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
(1963), which provides in part as follows: "[G]overnment existed only for the benefit of the men
who had submitted to it. Even when they used such collective phrases as 'the welfare of mankind,'
'the public good' and 'the benefit of the community,' they were thinking in terms of the welfare,
good, or benefit of each individual." Id. at 164-65.
29. Id. at 174.
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711.

themselves; while, on the other hand, the same law might to the minority
be in the highest degree offensive, unjust and tyrannical.8 0
Cooley's observation is particularly significant to the thesis of this
article. Heterosexual Americans, through the auspices of state legislatures, "voluntarily" create and "cheerfully" submit to criminal laws
which reinforce their sexual orientation. But, for the homosexual minority of our citizenry, recognition of their sexual orientation and the
fulfillment of their needs as human beings may result in criminal
punishment."'
Cooley's concern for the potential abuse of our majoritarian political process, when coupled with Madison's earlier forewarnings about
the possibility that popular opinion, not constitutional commitment,
could provide the basis of governmental decision making, is reflective of
an important and often overlooked fear of our forebearers. As the libertarians and their colonial counterparts constantly suggested, government was intended to maximize human aspiration by the protections it
provided for broadly shaped personal liberties and it was to minimize
human regulation only to those actions which could be proven to be
injurious to others.32 Thus, legislative assemblies, acting as mechanisms
to legitimize popular whim or bias, were to be cautiously monitored by
the judiciary for the purpose of protecting the personal liberties of each
citizen.3"
The commitment and success of the federal judiciary in fulfilling
this special function has been erratic at best. 3 One of the most frequentarguments posited in defense of judicial deference to legislative
enactments which limit personal autonomy is that the collective people
may be injured by the proscribed behavior. This public welfare argument does have some constitutional justification.
As has been suggested," the colonial and subsequent constitutional test for legitimate regulation of individual conduct is grounded
upon the theoretical concern that the harm produced by such behavior
may be injurious to society as a whole. Because this argument provides
the jurisprudential basis for placing criminal sanctions on private,

30.

Cooley, Editorial Comment, in J. STORY, I COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF
689 (M. Bigelow 5th ed. 1891).
31. See generally Rivera, supra note 4, at 949-51.
32. See supra text accompanying note 17.
33. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (J. Madison). See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 470
(A. Hamilton) (R. Fairfield ed. 1961).
34. For the position that there is a need for increased judicial restraint rather than continued judicial monitoring, see L. LUSKY, BY WHAT RIGHT? (1975); see also R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
35. See supra text accompanying note 17.
THE UNITED STATES
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adult, consensual, homosexual behavior, it is imperative that this investigation identify and then analyze its various theoretical components
before it turns to the case law that has addressed generally individual
autonomy and more specifically, homosexual behavior.
A.

Protection of the Public Welfare

The seminal jurisprudential question concerning the correct relationship between a citizen and the state has been the catalyst for literally volumes of scholarly inquiries and the basis for political strife
3 6.
sometimes culminating in revolution. Out of this constant philosophical and political quest for the legitimate role of the state, important
claims have been posited by Anglo-American jurisprudents that have
direct relevance to the central focus of this investigation-whether the
state through the auspices of its legislative assemblies may criminalize
private, consensual, sexual behavior.
What is known as the "police power" has been defined as a reserved power of state government guaranteed by the tenth amendment
of the Constitution. Its mandate has been described as the individual
state's power to protect the health, safety, welfare, and morals of its
citizenry.37 One of the most influential jurisprudential proponents of
such a broad interpretation of state sovereignty was Lord Patrick
Devlin.3 8
Following in the path of his nineteenth century counterpart, James
Fitzjames Stephen, 9 Devlin has taken the position that the criminal
law must protect the moral standards of the citizenry. While Devlin's
arguments for an unqualified use of the criminal law based upon the
0
police power to protect the community's "recognized morality"' were
presented in an unsuccessful attempt to rebut the findings of the
Wolfenden Committee on Homosexual Offenses and Prostitution in
England almost twenty-five years ago, their significance to American
1
judges and state legislators still remains powerful." He argued that
"[t]here are no theoretical limits to the power of the State to legislate
against treason and sedition, and likewise I think' 2there can be no theoretical limits to legislation against immorality.'
While there are serious flaws within Devlin's claim as it relates to
36. See generally T. HOBBES, THE LEVIATHAN (1651) (E. Rhys ed.); J. LOCKE, supra note
10; K. MARX & F. ENGELS, THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO (P. Sweezy & L. Huberman ed. 1964).

37. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887);
Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876).
38.

39.
40.
41.
42.

P. DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1965).
See J. STEPHEN, LIBERTY, EQUALITY AND FRATERNITY (R. White ed. 1967).
P. DEVLIN, supra note 38, at II.
See infra notes 200-37 and accompanying text.
P. DEVLIN, supra note 38, at 14.
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American constitutional government, the importance attached to the
protection of morality through the auspices of the criminal law can be
documented throughout our legislative and judicial traditions.4 Of
course, what is so remarkable is not that moral principles are inculcated into our codes for the regulation of individual conduct, but rather
that so little thoughtful analysis has accompanied their legislative creation or judicial application. 4 More specifically, what is needed is a
more articulate understanding of what constitutes our "recognized morality." Does it conform with the original principles of constitutional
government? Has the specific moral issue been set in context with other
moral principles? What measurement ought be used to determine what
behaviors fall within the purview of our criminal law? Because Devlin
directly or indirectly attempted to address these questions, further elucidation of his positions Will assist an analysis of Doe and its progeny.
While Devlin was not operating from the exact epistemological
system that formed the American constitutional process, his jurisprudential point of departure appears to be quite similar. Remembering
that individual liberty was thought to be "the parent of all virtues ' 4 5
and a cornerstone of our system of rules, Devlin's recognition that,
"[t]here must be toleration of the maximum individual freedom that is
consistent with the integrity of society,"" would suggest that there is a
shared, fundamental, aspirational first principle. He appears to agree
that personal autonomy and the choices inherently attached thereto
ought be tolerated, particularly when the choices concern "questions of
morals. '4 7 Indeed, at one point in his explication of how this principle
ought be instituted, he concurred with what has been previously described as the harm factor litmus test for limiting individual behavior.
He wrote that "before a society can put a practice beyond the limits of
tolerance there must be a deliberate judgment that the practice is injurious to society."' 8
Yet, Devlin's willingness to protect, or in his words "tolerate," a
citizen's personal choice in the realm of morals is grounded upon a
significantly different premise than that which this investigation has

43. See supra note 4; see also Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
44. At this stage it is important to indicate that this writer does not accept the jurisprudential basis upon which some scholars have suggested that there exists a separation between law and
morals. For an interesting discussion concerning this point see L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF
LAW (1964); H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY (1963); Dworkin, Lord Devlin and
the Enforcement of Morals, 75 YALE L.J. 986 (1966); Nicholson, The Internal Morality of Law:
Fuller and His Critics, 84 ETHICS 1 (1974).
45. See Jacobsen, supra note 10, at 131.
46. P. DEVLIN, supra note 38, at 16.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 17.
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suggested provides the basis for liberty in the American constitutional
system. It would appear that the key variable, for Devlin, which tips
the scales between individual freedom and the protection of the public
welfare, is based upon the depth of societal disdain for the so-called
immoral behavior. 9 The mechanism for measuring the harm of particular individual conduct upon the collective, then, is the depth of the
society's "disgust" for the behavior." While he does urge that "dislike"
of a particular practice by the majority of the citizenry is not sufficient
to limit the behavior through the arm of the criminal law, he suggests
that if there is "a real feeling of reprobation" the behavior ought be
criminally sanctioned.5 1 As to the specific application of this standard
to homosexual behavior, he confidently concluded that:
We should ask ourselves in the first instance whether, looking at it
calmly and dispassionately, we regard it as a vice so abominable that its
mere presence is an offense. If that is the genuine feeling of the society
in which we live, I do not see how society can be denied the right to
eradicate it.52
Setting aside for the moment his conclusion governing homosexual conduct, the epistemological justification for societal intrusion into what he
has described as individual freedom should be examined.
Lord Devlin, and some American jurists and legislators who expressly or impliedly espouse similar positions,53 ground their argument
for limiting individual liberty upon the state's right or obligation to
protect its "recognized morality. ' 54 The criteria that are to be used to
determine what constitutes this collective moral system, according to
Devlin, include: (a) whether the depth of societal disgust for the particular behavior is great; (b) whether there exists "a real feeling of reprobation;

' 55

(c) whether the behavior is believed to be "abominable;"

56

feeling concerning the particular
and finally (d) whether the societal
57
individual conduct is "genuine.

These indicia simply do not provide any real guidance to the legislator or the judge who must seek to balance individual and societal
rights and obligations. They certainly can not assist in determining
whether the bases for these feelings are produced by rational or irra-

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See infra notes 238-70 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying note 40.
See P. DEVLIN, supra note 38, at 17.
Id.
Id.
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tional beliefs. More importantly, they do not assist in determining
whether these subjective attitudes can be compatible with original principles of constitutional government and with the necessity for evidence
of empirically based harm directly related to the particular form of
individual conduct that is subject to criminal penalty.
But it is to be expected that those who begin with the premise that
"there can be no theoretical limits to the power of the State . . . to
legislate against immorality," 8 would produce a measurement device
for triggering the state's police power that equates potentially biased
majoritarian belief systems with legitimate governmental functioning.
Following this model of government, criminal punishment is based
upon the majority's "disgust" toward the particular behavior and the
perceived injury that it believes is created by the conduct.
If this theory of the role of the police power is accepted, then one
of the most important principles of our constitutional system-the
maximizing of personal liberty-may be waived for the nonempirically
based protection of the public welfare and morals. Ignorance, bias, or
intolerance can then provide the stimulus for majoritarian opinion that
may activate the police power.
As was suggested earlier, the draftsmen of our constitutional process believed that. government must bear the burden of proving that our
personal autonomy ought to be limited and our conduct punished. 5
The injury to another or to the collective must be real and not
imagined to justify governmental intrusion into the "domestic" concerns of the individual citizen."0 However, following the methodology
which Devlin proposes for determining whether homosexual behavior
ought be punished by criminal law via the police power-that is,
whether it is "regarded as a vice so abominable that its mere presence
is an offense," 61 it would seem that a perceived disgust for a particular
behavior, rather than an empirically proven societal or individual injury, is enough to satisfy any requirement of harm to the community.
While this understanding of the plenary power of government to control so-called injurious immoral conduct is fraught with serious jurisprudential and constitutional misrepresentation, 2 some of our state legislative assemblies and judical officers from both state and federal
benches appear to have succumbed to majoritarian political pressure or
have concurred implicitly with this view of government by affirming
challenged state statutes that criminalize private, adult, consensual, ho-

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

ld. at 14.
See supra text accompanying notes 14-17.
Id.
See supra text accompanying note 52.
See infra text accompanying notes 238-70.
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mosexual behavior.
111.

EMERGING PRINCIPLES OF PERSONAL AUTONOMY IN SEXUAL
RELATIONS: THE PRE-DOE CASES

As with most of our legal doctrines, the source of judicial precedent concerning homosexuality can be traced to the English common
law."3 Homosexuality was thought to be so horrible a crime that it
ought not to be named among Christians-"peccatumillud horrible,
inter christianos non nominandum .... 11" This quasi-ecclesiastical
attitude which was derived from what some contemporary theologians
believe to be an incorrect interpretation of Leviticus,6 5 has had an impact on American judicial decision making. Just as Lord Devlin, consciously or inadvertantly, chose the word "abominable" to describe immoral conduct which he believed should be proscribed by the criminal
law, our own judiciary has justified its determinations based upon this
language and the traditionally accepted Judeo-Christian interpretations
of the Old Testament.
As early as 1897, in Honselman v. People,6" counsel for the defendant argued that the indictment against his client, who was charged
with the "abominable and detestable crime against nature" was unconstitutionally vague. The court disagreed, holding that:
The existence of such an offense is a disgrace to human nature. The
legislation has not seen fit to define it further than by the general term,
with the details of difand the records of the courts need not be 6defiled
7
ferent acts which may go to constitute it.
Other state court decisions have agreed also that the "horrible"
activities surrounding homosexual behavior need not be expressed in a
criminal indictment.6 8 The justification for this departure from consti63. However, the English common law was not totally absorbed by colonial jurists. See
generally B. BAILYN, supra note I1,at 69.
64. W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *215-16 (W.C. Jones ed. 1916).
i will not act so disagreeable part, to my readers as well as myself, as to dwell any
longer upon a subject the very mention of which is a disgrace to human nature. It well be
more eligible to imitate, in this respect, the delicacy of our English law, which treats it in
its very indictments as crime not fit to be named: 'pecatum illud horrible, inter Christiano
non nominadum . . .' This the voice of nature and of reason, and the express law of God,
determined to be capital. Of which we have a signal instance, long before the Jewish
dispensation.
Id.
65. Leviticus 18:22 ("Thou shalt not lie with man, as with women; it is an abomination.");
accord Leviticus 20:13. See also Deuteronomy 23:17. For a discussion of the misinterpretation of
this section see A NEW CATECHISM 384 (K. Smyth trans. 2d ed. 1967).
172, 48 N.E. 304 (1897).
66. 168 Ill.
67. Id. at 175, 48 N.E. at 305.
68. See State v. Whitmarsh, 26 S.D. 426, 128 N.W. 580 (1910); Herring v. State, 119 Ga.
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tutionally guaranteed notice requirements within our criminal law indictment or information process is not clear. But one can surmise that
these courts found support for their rationales from debatable common
law and ecclesiastical interpretation. 9 Even more disconcerting than
the ultimate findings in these cases is the lack of any judicial analysis
regarding their conclusions.7 0 The dearth of explication on the procedural issue of appropriate notice, of course, is only symptomatic of judicial reluctance to address the more basic issue of the state's power to
limit individual liberty absent empirically documented personal or collective injury. While some have suggested that this is a purely jurisprudential question and that Devlin's positions are not relevant in a discussion of American constitutional government,7 1 such an interpretation
fails to understand the underlying interrelationship of general jurisprudential principles such as those espoused by Devlin and the specific
constitutional mechanisms which have been developed to address these
concerns.
The technique which has evolved in constitutional law that has attempted to balance the interests of personal liberty with the collective's
right to be free from injurious behavior is the compelling state interest
test. 72 The application of this standard entails a recognition of the general powers of the state to protect the public welfare and yet requires a
strong demonstration by the state that a citizen's liberty ought to be
constrained. Because the evolution of this test is riddled with judicial
presumptions of just what constitutes the public welfare or whether the
behavior is such that it should be raised to the level of a constitutional
liberty, it is obvious that considerations such as those offered by Devlin
can sometimes even unconsciously provide the unexpressed basis for judicial determinations which, with no more than a passing comment
about personal autonomy, conclude that private, adult, consensual, homosexual behavior does not require judicial protection.
The Supreme Court has addressed the general application of the
compelling state interest test on various occasions.73 Yet, in Doe v.

709, 46 S.E. 876 (1904); Commonwealth v. Dill, 160 Mass. 536, 36 N.E. 472 (1894).
69. Indeed, in Whitmarsh, 26 S.D. at -,
128 N.W. at 581, the court directly quoted
Blackstone's Commentaries concerning homosexuality.
70. It should be noted that more recent decisions by some state and federal courts have
either addressed this issue in greater depth or are preparing to do so. See, e.g., Polk v. Ellington,
309 F. Supp. 1349 (W.D. Tenn. 1970); Harris v. State, 457 P.2d 638 (Alaska 1969); Miller v.
State, 256 Ind. 296, 268 N.E.2d 299 (1971); Dixon v. State, 256 Ind. 266, 268 N.E.2d 84 (1971);
Barnes v. State, 255 Ind. 674, 266 N.E.2d 617 (1971); State v. Sharpe, I Ohio App. 2d 425, 205
N.E.2d 113 (1965).
71. W. BARNETT, SEXUAL FREEDOM AND THE CONSTITUTION 105 (1973).
72. L. LUSKY, supra note 34, at 249-53.
73. Id. See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Korematsu v. United States,
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Commonwealth's Attorney7 4 this standard was not applied and has
5
been mentioned only in passing in other earlier cases. Indeed, prior to
Doe, the Court frequently denied certiorari to lower court cases which
involved the rights of homosexuals. 76 Nevertheless, it is essential to this
investigation that the various components of the compelling state interest test be extracted from the pre-Doe Supreme Court decisions and
pieced together with selected lower court cases that have attempted to
grapple with the more specific issue of private, adult, consensual, homosexual behavior. In so doing, it will become apparent that considerations such as those articulated by Devlin, and expressed by turn-of-thetwentieth-century, lower court jurists, played a crucial role in obfuscating the central question in the regulation of individual behavior in
America: Has the government borne its burden of demonstrating that
the specific behavior is injurious to another citizen or to the society as a
whole?
A.

Developing a Constitutional Analysis

The application of the compelling state interest test requires the
reviewing court to determine whether the state's regulation of a particular behavior possesses a reasonable relationship to a legitimate governmental objective. It must also be shown that the proscription of the
targeted conduct is so essential for societal protection that a fundamental personal liberty must be subordinated for the protection of the public welfare.7 7 Before the reviewing court can address the aforementioned considerations it must decide first if the behavior is a liberty
which was intended to be protected by the Bill of Rights, if so, then
these additional elements must be satisfied. The primary query, then,
for any court which is asked to determine whether a legislative enactment that proscribes particular forms of personal behavior is constitutionally sound is: Does this statute intercede into the sanctity of personal choices which falls objectively within the purview of the intended
meaning of the Bill of Rights?
The Supreme Court has utilized numerous tests by which it has
determined whether certain behaviors can be described as fundamental
and, therefore, worthy of close judicial monitoring via the compelling
323 U.S. 214 (1944); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); Metropolitan Casualty Ins. Co.
v. Brownell, 294 U.S. 580 (1935).
74. See Doe, 403 F. Supp. at 1202.
75. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring); Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
76. See Anonymous v. Macy, 398 F.2d 317 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1041
(1969); Dew v. Halaby, 317 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 951 (1964).
77. See, e.g., Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960); Kent v. Dulles, 357
U.S. 116, 128-29 (1958).
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state interest test. 78 In Snyder v. Massachusetts,7 9 the Court urged that
the search for the meaning of our fundamental liberties must be directed toward the "traditions and [collective] conscience of our people." 80 And, in Hebert v. Louisiana,8 1 the Court suggested that the correct method by which to determine whether a particular conduct ought
to receive constitutional protection was to decide if the alleged right "is
of such a character that it cannot be denied without violating those
fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all
our civil and political institutions."8 Another standard cited in some of
the Court's more recent decisions was established in Palko v. Connecticut.8 3 In that case, the Court held that constitutional protections which
are "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" should be afforded to
American citizens.84 All of these standards, in some fashion or another,
have been the mechanisms. applied by the Court in cases concerning
personal sexual autonomy.
The Court in Poe v. Ullman85 circumvented a full-blown discussion by a majority of the justices as to the substantive constitutional
issue of whether states could criminally proscribe the use of contraceptive devices and the giving of medical advice on their use by deciding
that the case was not justiciable.8 Mr. Justice Douglas and Mr. Justice
Harlan, however, presented dissenting opinions which have provided
the jurisprudential foundations for an expanded meaning of the words
"liberty" and "fundamental." Justice Douglas believed that the word
"liberty" reflected all the specifically enumerated rights in the first
eight amendments of the Bill of Rights, 8 7 and also included other individual protections from governmental interference which evolved
"[f]rom the totality of the constitutional scheme under which we
live." 8 8 He urged that because the fourteenth amendment's due process
clause incorporated all of these liberties, state governments should be
responsible for their protection." But Justice Douglas' most insightful

78.
tion have
268 U.S.
U.S. 390
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

The types of activities which have been found to be entitled to fall within this descripranged from the right to educate one's child as one chooses, Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
'510 (1925), to the right to study German in private school, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
(1923).
291 U.S. 97 (1934).
Id. at 105.
272 U.S. 312 (1926).
Id. at 316.
302 U.S. 319 (1937).
See id. at 325.
367 U.S. 497 (1961).
Id. at 508-09.
U.S. CONST. amends. 1-VIII.
Poe, 367 U.S. at 521 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
See id. at 516-17.
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statement concerning the enterprise of determining what conduct could
be described as being "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" drew
upon the principles which this article has suggested formed our governmental process. 90 He wrote:
The regime of a free society needs room for vast experimentation. Crises,
emergencies, experience at the individual and community levels produce
new insights; problems emerge in new dimensions; needs, once never
imagined, appear. To stop experimentation and the testing of new decrees and controls is to deprive society of a needed versatility. Yet to say
that a legislature may do anything not within a specific guarantee of the
Constitution may be as crippling to a free society as to allow it to override specific guarantees so long as what it does fails to shock the sensibilities of a majority of the Court.9"
Like Madison's vision of government which produced our constitutional
system with its Bill of Rights, Douglas understood the subtle yet essential distinction between constitutional majoritarian government and legislative tyranny. That state involvement in personal decisions concerning the use of contraceptive devices breached the most basic notion of
what was implicit in the concept of ordered liberty was not only irrefutable for Douglas, but it was dangerously close to totalitarian government. 92 While ultimately concluding in Poe that the privacy of the
marital relationship was the principle which deserved constitutional
protection, his eloquent analysis reached far beyond the specific facts of
that case and into the core of governmental interference with private
sexual relations. 93
Mr. Justice Harlan, while also finding constitutional justification
for striking down the Connecticut statute, believed that the essential
factor which made the law so iniquitous was "the intrusion of the
whole machinery of the criminal law into the very heart of marital privacy." 94 It was this invasion of the "private realm of family life" 95
upon which Harlan built his rationale. Unlike Douglas who reached
beyond considerations of marriage to determine the legitimate functioning of the state, Harlan carved out one zone of privacy which deserves to be entitled a "liberty." But he quickly rejected any notion
that this "liberty" described as marital privacy could be extended to
other areas of sexual relations. 96 Implicit in the concept of ordered lib-

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

See supra notes 10-21 and accompanying text.
Poe, 367 U.S. at 518 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
See id. at 522.
See id. at 521.
Id. at 553 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 552 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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erty, for Harlan, were those sexual mores which had been traditionally
accepted by the state. Since the institution of marriage had always
been given special status throughout our history, he concluded that intrusion by the use of this statute into the sanctity of the relationship
between husband and wife would destroy the foundations of familial
97
relations.
Harlan quickly distinguished his interpretation of this privacy
right from other forms of sexual behavior which he believed the state
could constitutionally prohibit. He wrote:
The right of privacy most manifestly is not an absolute. Thus, I would
not suggest that adultery, homosexuality, fornication and incest are immune from criminal enquiry, however privately practiced. But not to discriminate between what is involved in this case and either the traditional
offenses against good morals or crimes which, though they may be committed anywhere, happen to have been committed or concealed in the
home, would entirely misconceive the argument that is being made.98
Therefore, with a majority of the Court unwilling to reach any of the
substantive constitutional arguments presented by either Douglas or
Harlan, the basic question of whether personal autonomy in the realm
of private, consensual, sexual relations ought to receive constitutional
protection was left unanswered. One of the dissenters even qualified the
application of the right to privacy to sexual decisions framed only
within the contours of his vision of marriage and the American family.99 But five years later some of the same issues were brought before
the Court once again.
In Griswold v. Connecticut,0 " with two justices dissenting and
three offering concurring opinions, the Court held that a state statute
which forbade the use of contraceptives or the dissemination of information concerning their usage was in violation of the right of marital
privacy.10 1 Justice Douglas, writing for the majority, quickly disavowed
any intention on the part of the Court to rely upon earlier decisions
which had grounded their rationale upon the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment. 0 2 Attempting to avoid claims that the Court
was resurrecting the controversial substantive due process technique in
an effort to function as a "super-legislature,"' 0 3 Douglas found consti-

97. See id. at 553.
98. Id. at 552-53 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
99. Id. at 546 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
100. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
101. Id.at 481-86.
102. See id.at 482; see also Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). Unfortunately this
debate continues even today. See supra note.34.
103. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482.
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tutional support for overturning the Connecticut law in the first amendment's right to association and the third, fourth, fifth, and ninth
104 Citing Boyd v. United States 0 5
amendments' "zones of privacy."
and its interpretation of the fourth and fifth amendments, Douglas
stressed that the right to privacy was a "protection against all governmental invasions 'of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of
life.' "106 He concluded that the statute was unconstitutional not only
because it clearly impinged upon considerations of personal privacy,
but also because its application permitted techniques of enforcement
which "sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of
protected freedoms."10 7
Justice Goldberg, along with Chief Justice Warren and Justice
Brennan, concurred with Douglas' determination that the Connecticut
statute was unconstitutional. But, they believed that the ninth amendment ought be the constitutional basis for the protection of the right of
privacy.108 After a historical analysis of the Framers' concerns on how
individual liberty could best be protected within our constitutional
structure,1 0 9 Goldberg agreed that constitutional protection could be afforded to Americans via a general right of privacy. He went further
and suggested that simply because a particular right is not specifically
mentioned in the Bill of Rights, the Court is not prohibited from reaching into what Douglas in Poe described as, "the totality of the constitutional scheme under which we live."' 10 Applying the tests already mentioned in this analysis,"" Justice Goldberg addressed the question of
whether private decision making between two consenting adults concerning sexual behavior ought to be deemed fundamental.1 12 If so, did
the Connecticut statute have not only a reasonable relationship to some
legitimate governmental objective but also could the encroachment
upon this fundamental liberty be defended because there existed a cpmpelling state interest that necessitates such a restriction?" The concurring justices believed that there was such a fundamental personal liberty and that Connecticut had not demonstrated any "subordinating

104. Id. at 484.
105. 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
106. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484.
107. Id. at 485 (quoting NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964).
108. Id. at 492-94 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
109. Id. at 489-91. For a different view of the ninth amendment see Caplan, The History
and Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 69 VA. L. Rav. 223 (1983).
110. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 494 (Douglas, J., dissenting). See also Poe, 367 U.S. at 517.
III. See supra notes 72-83 and accompanying text.
112. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 499.
113. Id. at 497-98.
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[state] interest which is compelling."" ' But, similar to Justice Harlan's
concerns evinced in Poe v. Ullman,' 5 Goldberg ended his analysis by
specifically distinguishing the legitimate personal liberty which he believed exists for marital privacy in sexual decision making from what
he described as a "State's proper regulation of sexual promiscuity or
misconduct."1 1 6 So as to leave no doubt concerning the application of
his concurring rationale, he quoted Harlan's dissent in Poe as precedential justification that behaviors such as adultery and homosexuality
were "sexual intimacies" which fell outside the purview of ninth
11 7 .
amendment protection.
While the Griswold decision repudiated a long established judicial
reluctance to address matters of sexual privacy, both the majority and
concurring opinions cautiously implaRted the right to personal autonomy in sexual behavior within the confines of the traditional marriage
relationship. The justifications or lack thereof for such incremental
changes in constitutional decision making provided the grist for numerous jurisprudential discussions. 118 By 1972, however, the theoretical
discussions concerning the appropriate limitations of state involvement
in private, sexual autonomy culminated into a reviewable case and controversy which, collaterally involved the rights of unmarried citizens to
obtain contraceptives.
In Eisenstadt v. Baird,"9 the Court through Justice Brennan declared unconstitutional a Massachusetts statute which prohibited selling or giving away any contraceptive drug or device to unmarried persons. The Court chose not to apply the compelling state interest
standard as they had in Griswold.'2" Instead, the majority believed that
the state statute failed what Justice Brennan described as "even the
more lenient equal protection standard."'' Therefore, while the Eisenstadt decision did not utilize the compelling state interest standard, it
did analyze the scope of the right to privacy in personal sexual autonomy beyond the confines of the marriage relationship. Focusing solely
upon the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, Bren-

114. Id. at 497.
115. 367 U.S. 497.
116. 381 U.S. at 498-99.
117. Id. at 499.
118. See Beaney, The Constitutional Right to Privacy in the Supreme Court, SUP. CT.
REV. 212 (1962); Griswold, The Right to Be Let Alone, 55 Nw. U.L. REV. 216 (1960); Paust,
Human Rights and the Ninth Amendment: A New Form of Guarantee, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 231
(1975); Note, The Uncertain Renaissance of the Ninth Amendment, 33 U. CHI. L. REV. 814
(1966).
119. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
120. Id. at 447 n.7.
121. Id.
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nan restricted his constitutional analysis to the issue of whether the
state statute was based upon an objective rationale which justified
treating married and unmarried citizens differently. 22 He found no
such justification. While he readily admitted that a state has the constitutional power to distinguish between different groups of its citizens, it
may do so only if the public purpose for the statute can be demonstrated to be reasonable. 2 3
From a review of Massachusetts Supreme Court decisions which
interpreted the statute's general intent, Justice Brennan found that the
purpose for the legislation was "to encourage premarital sexual intercourse." ' 2 In theory, Brennan noted that such an objective may be legitimate.1 25 But he believed that upon close examination it was not reasonable to think that the prevention of premarital or even extramarital
sexual relations was the purpose of this legislation. He found that not
only did this statute in effect "prescribe pregnancy and the birth of an
unwanted child as punishment for fornication," 1 28 but also that the
availability of such devices to unmarried as well as married persons
was admitted to be widespread.1 27 By making contraceptives available
to married persons without sanctioning their potential "illicit sexual relations with unmarried persons ' 128 this statute established an irrational
and unequal classification between citizens. 129 Finally, Justice Brennan
concluded that the arbitrary nature of the statute could be demonstrated clearly by comparing the criminal sanctions placed upon this
"crime" versus fornication. The latter was a misdemeanor with a thirty
dollar fine or three month jail term attached while this statute was a
felony, punishable by five years in prison.1 30
While the Eisenstadtmajority did not address the specific question
of whether a state, absent rational justifications based upon the protection of the public health, could prohibit contraception upon considerations of public morality, important dicta was offered that has direct
relevancy to the analogous issues inherent in private, adult, consensual,
homosexual relations. Brennan wrote:
It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered in the
marital relationship. Yet the marital couple is not an independent entity

122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 448.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 448-49 (quoting Griswold, 381 U.S. at 498 (Goldberg, J.,concurring)).
Id. at 449.
Id. at 454.
Id. at 449.
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with a mind and heart of its own, but an association of two individuals
each with a separate intellectual and emotional makeup. If the right of
privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so
fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.131
Therefore, while the majority placed its stamp of disapproval upon the
Massachusetts statute based upon violations of equal protection, it nevertheless indicated that the more compelling issue of privacy had not
been forgotten. In fact, it appeared as if the illogical rigidity of the
Griswold rationale-finding a narrow privacy right for married Americans yet leaving unmarried citizens without constitutional protection-was finally discredited. Just as importantly, Brennan's recognition of the historical significance attached to the necessity of judicial
monitoring of arbitrary governmental action demonstrated a willingness by the Court to add an additional constitutional mechanism, the
equal protection clause, to its arsenal for the protection of personal autonomy. Reminiscent of Thomas Cooley's concern cited earlier in this
article, 1 32 the Eisenstadt Court noted the concerns which Mr. Justice
Jackson had articulated in an earlier Supreme Court decision:
[Niothing opens the door to arbitrary action so effectively as to allow
those officials to pick and choose only a few to whom they will apply
legislation and thus to escape the political retribution that might be visited upon them if larger numbers were affected. 133
Armed with a broader vision of the right of personal privacy and an
emerging respect for the potential application of the equal protection
clause to individual decision making in the realm of sexual relations,
the Court one year after Eisenstadt decided to address an even more
socially volatile issue-abortion.
In Roe v. Wade'34 and its companion case Doe v. Bolton,136 the
Court was once again asked to determine the constitutional parameters
of state regulation of personal autonomy in sexual relations. After
years of state legislative prohibition of abortions and much judicial confusion about whether such cases were justiciable,'3 6 a majority of the
Supreme Court held Texas and Georgia statutes unconstitutional, find131. Id. at 453.
132. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
133. 405 U.S. at 454 (quoting Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106,
112-13 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
134. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
135. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
136. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 943 (1978); see also Wilkinson &
White, ConstitutionalProtectionfor Personal Life-Styles, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 563, 593 (1977).
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ing them to be in violation of the fourteenth amendment's concept of
personal liberty. 37 Mr. Justice Blackmun writing for the majority determined that the right to personal privacy was "fundamental" and
"implicit in the context of ordered liberty."' 3 8 As a result, he applied
the compelling state interest standards to the statutes at issue. He reasoned that there were two potentially legitimate purposes for state statutes which proscribed abortions. The first was the state's theoretical
obligation to protect women from dangerous medical procedures." 9
While such a purpose might have justified a subordination of this personal right when abortions created a real threat of risk of life to the
woman at a time when any surgery was dangerous, Blackmun dismissed such a reason as compelling when the abortion is performed in
early pregnancy. 4 The second reason for state limitation of abortions
which could arguably be presented, Blackmun wrote, was the state's
obligation to protect prenatal life. 4 ' Yet, although he recognized the
state's corresponding obligation to preserve and protect the potentiality
of human life, he believed that the most important issue was the determination of when this obligation becomes primary as against the right
of the woman to be free from unwarranted governmental intervention.' 4 ' While the Court's response to this question continues to stir
academic and political controversy,"13 Blackmun's rationale was well
within the logical framework of judicial precedent established in Griswold and Eisenstadt and reflective of traditional constitutional interpretations of when, if at all, potential human life receives constitutional
protection.
1 4
Rejecting any argument that the right to privacy is absolute,
Blackmun suggested that, "[a]t some point in pregnancy, these respective interests become sufficiently compelling to sustain regulation of
factors that govern the abortion decision."" 5 He reasoned that the personal right of privacy of the woman diminishes in constitutional significance proportionate to the increasing medical likelihood that the fetus
will be capable of viability." '6 Thus, he concluded that while the right
to privacy encompasses the right of a woman, in consultation with her
physician, to have an abortion within the first trimester of pregnancy,

137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
Id. at 152.
Id. at 148.
Id. at 129-52.
Id. at 150.
Id.
See supra note 34; see also A. Cox, supra note 25.
Roe, 410 U.S. at 153-54.
Id. at 154.
Id. at 155.
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the compelling state interest to protect potential human life could
subordinate this right even to the point of constitutionally proscribing
the performance of an abortion at the later stages of pregnancy.14
But it was Justice Douglas who understood the significance of this
decision to the broader issues of governmental intrusion into the private
decisions of individual Americans. Addressing the interrelated meanings of the ninth and fourteenth amendments, he enumerated a "catalogue" of the rights which he believed were intended to fall within the
gambit of these provisions of the Bill of Rights. The word "liberty"
within the fourteenth amendment and "the rights retained by the people" inferred in the ninth amendment meant to Douglas "the autonomous control over the development and expression of one's intellect,
interests, tastes, and personality . . . freedom of choice in the basic
decisions of one's life respecting marriage, divorce, procreation, contraception, and the education and upbringing of children . . . the freedom
to care for one's health and person."148 The evolution of the right of
personal autonomy appeared to have reached its most sophisticated
stage of constitutional development. It was not absolute. The state
could subordinate personal privacy if it could demonstrate a legitimate
governmental objective and that harm was in fact being done to the
collective or to another. But the right of privacy was not some limited
protection applicable only to married person. It inured to all Americans
involved in decisions relating to private, consensual, sexual affairs. Yet
the applicability of the right to personal autonomy in sexual relations
to private, adult, consensual, homosexual behavior still remained
unclear.
B.

The Constitutional Analysis of the Lower Courts

During the Griswold to Roe period numerous lower court cases
attempted to determine whether the Supreme Court's recognition of
personal privacy also applied to homosexual conduct. For example, in a
series of decisions involving government employment and eligibility requirements for immigration and naturalization, some lower courts rejected government contentions that homosexual behavior per se was a
sufficient justification for job dismissal or deportation. In Scott v.
Macy, 49 the court held that while the government could legitimately
require more information concerning a person's background when he or
she was seeking employment with the federal government, applicants
"do not, wholly apart from fifth amendment concerns, forfeit all rights

147.
148.
149.

Id. at 165.
Bolton, 410 U.S. at 211-12.
402 F.2d 644 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
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of privacy." 16 0 One year later in Norton v. Macy, 5 ' the same court
held that there must be a reasonable nexus between the so-called immoral behavior and the performance of the job in question.16 2 Once
again calling upon considerations of the general constitutional right to
be let alone, Judge Bazelon wrote for the majority, "the notion that it
could be an appropriate function of the federal bureaucracy to enforce
the majority's conventional codes of conduct in the private lives of its
employees is at war with elementary concepts of liberty, privacy, and
diversity."1 53 By 1971 there was some indication that considerations of
personal privacy were beginning to be recognized in immigration and
naturalization law. The In re Labady' decision is an excellent example. In this case an applicant for naturalization admitted participation
in private, consensual, homosexual acts.1 55 Rejecting government arguments that such acts were violative of the "good moral character" requirement for naturalization, the court held that:
[T]he most important factor to be considered is whether the challenged
conduct is public or private in nature. If it is public or if it involves a
large number of other persons, it may pose a threat to the community.
If, on the other hand, it is entirely private, the likelihood of harm to
others is minimal and any effort to regulate or penalize the conduct may
lead to an unjustified invasion of the individual's constitutional
rights. . . . In short, private conduct which is not harmful to others,
even though it may violate the personal moral code of most of us, does
not violate public morality ....156
The In re Labady holding was unquestionably a marked expansion
of the Griswold finding. Although this case was limited to the narrow
arena of immigration and naturalization law, the court's recognition of
personal decisions which fall outside the purview of government regulation and its laudable effort to address the empirical question of whether
collective or individual harm was produced by this conduct set the
stage for additional analysis in a criminal case decided two years
157
later.
Basing its rationale upon the Supreme Court's decision in Eisen-

150.
151.
152.
153.

Id. at 648.
417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
Id.at 1167.
Id.at 1165.

154.

326 F. Supp. 924 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).

155. Id. at 925-26.
156. Id.at 927.
157. The problem of applying constitutional standards concerning this evolving right to dramatically differing fact patterns can be seen lucidly in this federal judicial decision-making era.
Nevertheless, the analogous nature of the inherently intimate forms of personal conduct even here
are jurisprudentially defensible.
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stadt,158 a federal district court in Lovisi v. Slayton' 59 held that the
right of privacy extended to private acts of sodomy between married or
unmarried adults.' Although the court refused to insulate the defendants from criminal responsibility, it found that they had waived their
privacy rights by taking photographs of their sexual activities, and indicated that had the issue before them been untainted with such a waiver
and had instead been focused upon private sexual activity between consenting adults, the right of sexual privacy would protect the participants from state intrusion.' 6 1 The language of the court has particular
importance to homosexual behavior. Judge Merhige wrote that, "[i]t is
not marriage vows which make intimate and highly personal the sexual
behavior of human beings. It is, instead, the nature of sexuality itself or
something intensely private to the individual that calls forth constitutional protection."' 62 By 1975 the impact of Griswold, Eisenstadt, and
Roe could be seen in lower state trial courts.
In People v. Rice,1 3 the defendants, two single individuals who
were charged with consensual sodomy, challenged the New York criminal statute as unconstitutional in violation of their right to privacy and
the equal protection clause."" The trial court agreed.' 65 Citing both
Griswold and Eisenstadt, the court held that the right of privacy encompasses "the basic right of an individual to privacy."' 6 6 In an attempt to determine if there was a legitimate governmental purpose
which could support such an invasion of personal autonomy in sexual
relations, the court concluded that no such "overriding or compelling
state interest" was present. 6 7 Responding to the state's argument that
the statute in question was designed "[t]o proscribe conduct which
"unjustifiably and inexcusably causes or threatens substantial harm to
individual or public interests,"' 6 8 Judge LaCarrubba wrote that "[w]e
cannot see how the activities of two consenting adults threatens or
causes any, nonetheless substantial, harm to either individual or public

158.
159.
U.S. 977
160.
161.
162.
163.
N.Y.S.2d
(1977).
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
1975)).

405 U.S. 438.
363 F. Supp. 620 (E.D. Va. 1973), affid, 539 F.2d 349 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429
(1976).
Id. at 624-25.
Id. at 625-27.
Id. at 625.
80 Misc. 2d 511, 363 N.Y.S.2d 484 (Dist. Ct. 1975), rev'd, 87 Misc. 2d 257, 383
799 (App. Term 1976), affd, 41 N.Y.2d 1018, 363 N.E.2d 1371, 395 N.Y.S.2d 626
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

512,
517,
515,
515,
514,

363 N.Y.S.2d at 486.
363 N.Y.S.2d at 490.
363 N.Y.S.2d at 489.
363 N.Y.S.2d at 488.
363 N.Y.S.2d at 488 (quoting N.Y. Penal Law § 1.105(1) (McKinney
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interests. Nor can we see any threat to public safety."' 16 9
While the Rice decision was an articulate and logical application
of the right to privacy as established by Griswold, Eisenstadt, and Roe,
in the very same year a three-judge federal district court in Virginia
came to a completely different conclusion.' 7 Indeed, the Supreme
Court's summary affirmance in Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney'
has had an important impact on the status of the right to be let alone
for all homosexual Americans.
IV.

DOE AND ITS PROGENY: CONSTITUTIONAL COMMITMENT OR
CONTRADICTION?

The Virginia Federal District Court was asked to provide injunctive relief for homosexuals charged with violating the state's sodomy
statute and to declare the statute unconstitutional as it was applied to
private, adult, consensual, homosexual relations. 72 Two of the three
judges denied the request for injunctive relief and held the Virginia
statute constitutional. Judge Bryan, with whom Judge Lewis concurred,
believed that the statute did not violate a constitutional right to privacy. 7 3 Citing Griswold-the Supreme Court's most recent decision as
to "its views on the question here,' ' 1 74 the two judges argued that the
right of privacy was operative only within the context of marriage,
home, and family.' 75 The judges found irrefutable Justice Goldberg's
concurring opinion in Griswold which relied upon Justice Harlan's
dicta in Poe v. Ullman that presumed "[a]dultery, homosexuality and
the like are sexual intimacies which the State forbids.' 76 Concluding
then that homosexuality could be proscribed through the criminal law,
they posited 77 that even though the behavior occurred in private, if the
state determined that punishment was "appropriate in the promotion of
morality and decency, it is not for the courts to say that the State is not

169. Id. at 514-15, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 488.
170. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd mem.,
425 U.S. 901 (1976).
171. Id.
172. Id. at 1200. At the time Doe was decided, the Virginia sodomy statute provided:
If any person shall carnally know in any manner any brute animal, or carnally know any
male or female person by the anus or by or with the mouth, or voluntarily submit to such
carnal knowledge, he or she shall be guilty of a felony and shall be confined in the penitentiary not less than one year nor more than three years.
Id. (quoting Va. Code § 18.1-212 (1950)).
173. Id. at 1200-02.
174. Id. at 1200.
175. Id. at 1201.
176. Id. (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 553 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
177. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199, 1202 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd
mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
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free to do so." In short, it is an inquiry addressable only to the State's
' 78
Legislature.'
Having so concluded, the judges confidently held that the state's
police power provided constitutional justification for this statute and
that it bore a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest-the
suppression of crime and the prevention of moral delinquency. 179 The
judges rejected any contention that the state was required to prove that
"moral delinquency actually results from homosexuality."1 80 Instead,
they held that the state need only demonstrate that private, adult, consensual, homosexual behavior "is likely to end in a contribution to
moral delinquency. "181 Apparently, the basis for this conclusion was
the judges' belief that it would be "impracticable" for the state to
prove the empirical basis for such a belief; in their words, "the law is
not so exacting.' 8 s2 To support their rationale that moral delinquency
was related directly to private, adult, consensual, homosexual behavior,
the judges offered the facts of Lovisi as "just such a sexual orgy as the
statute was evidently intended to punish."' 8 3 The judges did not, however, offer any discussion of how the facts in that case in any way were
analogous to the issue present in the case at bar. The judges ultimately
found solace, as have many of their judicial counterparts,18 4 in calling
upon the historical longevity of the criminal proscription and its direct
ascendency from our Judeo-Christian and common-law traditions. 8 5
Judge Merhige, citing the trilogy of cases beginning with Griswold, including Eisenstadt, and ending with Roe, argued in dissent
that the majority had "misapplied" the Supreme Court's interpretation
of the fourteenth amendment's due process clause protection of the
right to personal privacy.' 8 6 He wrote:
The Supreme Court has consistently held that [it] protects the right of
individuals to make personal choices, unfettered by arbitrary and purposeless restraints, in the private matters of marriage and procreation. . . .I view those cases as standing for the principle that every individual has a right to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion
into one's decisions on private matters of intimate concern. A mature
individual's choice of an adult sexual partner, in the privacy of his or her
own home, would appear to me to be a decision of the utmost private and

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See supra notes 65-70 and accompanying text.
See Doe, 403 F. Supp. at 1202-03.
Id. at 1203.
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intimate concern. Private consensual sex acts between adults are matters,
absent evidence that they are harmful, in which the state has no legiti87
mate interest.

Moreover, the judge reminded his colleagues that they had not placed
the Griswold commentary by Justice Goldberg in context with two
later cases that they mysteriously failed to cite in their analysis of the
right to privacy.1 8 8 Identifying Eisenstadt as a more recent reflection
by the Court that "the right to privacy in sexual relationships is not
limited to the marital relationship,"' 89 he stressed that the right to personal autonomy logically included the selection of a "consenting adult
sexual partner."' 19 0 Absent a showing by the state that there was a
compelling state interest to proscribe this choice, whether it involved
heterosexuals or homosexuals, the exercise of this right could not be
restricted.' 9'
Judge Merhige indicated that such a conclusion in no way establishes an absolute right for individuals to participate in sexual relations.' 92 The conduct must take place free from coercion and therefore
must involve adults legally defined as such.' 93 The conduct must also be
private. 9 4" Therefore, activity which takes place in "publicly frequented
areas" cannot receive constitutional protection. 9 5 But just as important
as Judge Merhige's analysis of relevant Supreme Court decisions was
his scholarly reliance upon the state's inability to provide any evidence
that private, adult, consensual, homosexual behavior causes harm to
any individual or the collective as a whole.' 9 6 In a cogent response to
his judicial colleagues he wrote:
To suggest, as defendants do, that the prohibition of homosexual conduct
will in some manner encourage new heterosexual marriages and prevent
the dissolution of existing ones is unworthy of judicial response. In any
event, what we know as men is not forgotten as judges-it is difficult to
envision any substantial number of heterosexual marriages being in danger of dissolution because of the private sexual activities of
homosexuals.' 9 7

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Id.
See id. at 1204.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1204-05.
Id. at 1205.
Id.
Id.
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Judge Merhige correctly concluded that the issue for his colleagues was not the right to privacy, but rather what they believed to
be appropriate moral conduct. 198 Such a construction of the issue, he
reasoned, was not only jurisprudently incorrect, it was a direct violation
of a citizen's constitutional right to personal privacy. 199 Other lower
courts have agreed with Judge Merhige and have refused to accept the
logic of the Doe majority. In fact, the Supreme Court's summary affirmance of Doe has created numerous responses from some state tribunals asked to determine the constitutionality of their respective criminal laws proscribing private, adult, consensual, sexual behavior.
For example, in State v. Saunders,0 0 the Supreme Court of New
Jersey addressed whether the state's criminal fornication statute
prohibiting all sexual relations between men and unmarried women was
unconstitutional. Citing Eisenstadt,Roe, and Carey v. PopulationSer2 0 1 the
vices International,
Court held that the statute was unconstitutional pursuant to the right to privacy which they believed emanated
from the first, third, fourth, fifth, and ninth amendments of the Constitution. 202 Judge Pashman, writing for the majority, urged that the
meaning of the right to privacy could not be limited to only "the private situations" of the prior cases.20 3 Instead, he believed that the fundamental nature of the right to privacy could be more clearly understood if it was viewed as the "freedom of personal development." ' 20 '
Whether the issue is fornication, contraception, abortion, or even the
personal choice to maintain or stop "heroic" measures which may be
used to sustain physiological functioning of the human body, Judge
Pashman concluded that these decisions are within the constitutionally
protected realm of personal autonomy.2 0 5
The majority gave little credence to the Supreme Court's summary affirmance in Doe. The New Jersey Supreme Court pointed to
what it believed to be an apparent disagreement within the United
States Supreme Court about the impact of Doe, 06 and instead directed
its attention to whether there was a compelling state interest which
could justify the fornication statute. 0 7 After rejecting the state's con-

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

Id.
See id. at 1203.
75 N.J. 200, 381 A.2d 333 (1977).
431 U.S. 678 (1977).
Saunders, 75 N.J. at 210-11, 381 A.2d at 338.
Id. at 211-12, 381 A.2d at 339.
Id. at 213, 381 A.2d at 339.
Id.
Id. at 215-16, 381 A.2d at 340. See also Carey, 431 U.S. at 688 n.5, 694 n.17, 718

207.

Saunders, 75 N.J. at 217, 381 A.2d at 341.

n.2.
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tentions that the statute was essential in preventing venereal disease,
the propagation of illegitimate children and the protection of the marital relationship, 08 the Saunders court repeated the underlying constitutional priority which has been the core of Supreme Court decision making since Griswold and which has its foundation in our constitutional
history. Judge Pashman stressed that "[p]rivate personal acts between
two consenting adults are not to be lightly meddled with by the
State. ' 20 9 Unlike the federal district court in Doe, the Saunders majority refused to believe that a "remedy" for supposed immoral conduct
should "come from legislative fiat. '2 10 Concluding that "the right of
personal autonomy is fundamental to a free society,"2'1 1 the New Jersey
Supreme Court noted an important consideration overlooked by some
reviewing courts: "Surely the dignity of the law is undermined when an
intimate personal activity between consenting adults can be dragged
into court and 'exposed.' ",212 But the New Jersey Supreme Court was
not the only court which was unwilling to accept the apparent impact
of the Supreme Court's summary affirmance of Doe.
In Commonwealth v. Bonadio,21 3 a case involving a challenge to a
state statute which prohibited "voluntary deviate sexual intercourse"
between unmarried persons, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania also
rejected Doe's acceptance of plenary power of state legislatures to
criminalize any behavior a majority of lawmakers believe to be contrary to the public morals. 2 4 The Bonadio court did not address directly the fundamental right of personal autonomy,2 15 but its decision
was an excellent analysis of most issues intertwined within the realm of
private, adult, consensual, sexual behavior. Declaring the Pennsylvania
statute unconstitutional in violation of the fourteenth amendment's
equal protection clause, Justice Flaherty joined a long line of jurists
and scholars in reinforcing the legitimate function of the state's police
power. 216 He suggested that the state could justifiably protect the collective from coerced sexual conduct, and protect minors from sexual
contact by adults and other forms of sexual conduct.2 17 But he concluded that the statute under scrutiny exceeded any legitimate function
of the police power. He wrote that:

208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

Id.
Id. at 220, 381 A.2d at 342.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 220, 381 A.2d at 343.
490 Pa. 91, 415 A.2d 47 (1980).
Id. at 95-98, 415 A.2d at 49-51.
Id. at 49. See also id. at 47 n.2.
Id. at 98-99, 415 A.2d at 51.
Id. at 95, 415 A.2d at 49.
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With respect to regulation-of morals, the police power should properly be
exercised to protect each individual's right to be free from interference in
defining and pursuing his own morality but not to enforce a majority
morality on persons whose conduct does not harm others .

. .

. Many

issues that are considered to be matters of morals are subject to debate,
and no sufficient state interest justifies legislation of norms simply because a particular belief is followed by a number of people, or even a
majority.2 1 8
Calling upon the political philosophical principles espoused by
John Stuart Mill in On Liberty,219 which received their impetus from
the libertarians, 221 the Bonadio majority argued that absent a showing
of harm to another, sexual morality was beyond the legitimate purview
of the state police power. 221 But, because the issue before the court was
the discriminatory nature of the Pennsylvania statute as it applied to
unmarried adults, they grounded their rationale upon the absence of
any legitimate state objectives for the creation of such a proscription.22 2
As the Supreme Court had determined in Eisenstadt, Justice Flaherty
concluded that even if there was a rational basis for proscribing this
form of sexual behavior, there was no justification to distinguish between married and unmarried Americans. 223
In the same year, the highest court in New York also declared its
consensual sodomy statute unconstitutional. In People v. Onofre,224 the
court was asked to determine whether its penal law which criminalized
consensual sodomy or deviant sexual intercourse between unmarried
persons violated the constitutional rights of privacy and equal protection. The New York court joined Pennsylvania in finding that the state
legislature had unconstitutionally established illegitimate distinctions
between married and unmarried sexual conduct and had interceded
without any compelling interest into the sanctity of personal privacy. 225
Citing a litany of Supreme Court decisions which defined the broad
meaning of the right to privacy, Judge Jones rejected the state's contention that the fundamental right of personal decisions applied only to
sexual behavior conducted within the marital unit and for procreation.2 26 Similar to the New Jersey and Pennsylvania decisions, the New

218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
(1981).
225.
226.

Id. at 96, 415 A.2d at 50 (emphasis in original).
Id.
See supra notes 10-21 and accompanying text.
Bonadio, 91 Pa. at 98, 415 A.2d at 51.
Id. at 99, 415 A.2d at 51.
Id.
51 N.Y.2d 476, 415 N.E.2d 936, 434 N.Y.S.2d 947 (1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 987
Id. at 489-90, 415 N.E.2d 936.
Id. at 486-87, 415 N.E.2d 939.
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York court stated that absent a showing that private, consensual, sexual behavior was harmful, their state sodomy statute was constitutionally infirm. 22 7 Arguments based upon the need for the protection of the
institution of marriage, the necessity of bolstering public morality, or
the paternalistic protection of individuals from physical harm, were rejected absent any empirical data to substantiate these purported justifications. 22 8 Judge Jones and his colleagues pierced through the veil of
the state's arguments by citing a legislative memorandum which indicated that "the Legislature's decision to restore the consensual sodomy
offense was, as with adultery, based largely upon the premises that deletion thereof might ostensibly be construed as legislative approval of
deviate conduct. ' 229 The state legislature's disapproval of private consensual sexual conduct, without a demonstration of harm was simply
not considered to be a constitutional justification to intrude upon an
individual's right of personal autonomy. Judge Jones aptly concluded
that:
Personal feelings of distaste for the conduct sought to be proscribed...
and even disapproval by a majority of the populace, if that disapproval
were to be assumed, may not substitute for the required demonstration
of a valid basis for intrusion by the State in an area of important personal decision protected under
the right of privacy drawn from the
2 30
United States Constitution.
But, similar to Bonadio2 31 the New York court did not base its
conclusion upon the right to privacy. Instead, it applied in its review of
the statute the theoretically more lenient standard attendant to the
equal protection clause.2 32 Yet, even when the issue was narrowed to
whether the statute possessed a rational relationship to a legitimate
government objective, the law failed to withstand constitutional scrutiny.2 33 As with the Pennsylvania statute, New York's penal law
prohibiting sodomy between unmarried adults established a prohibition
against one class of its citizens which simply did not bear a rational
justification and which was discriminatory on its face.234
The New York court joined the highest courts in the states of New
Jersey and Pennsylvania in refusing to accept the precedential value of
Doe. Instead of construing the state constitution to require more re-
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228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

Id. at 492, 415 N.E.2d at 942-43.
Id. at 491, 415 N.E.2d at 942.
Id. at 489, 415 N.E.2d at 941.
Id. at 490, 415 N.E.2d at 941-42.
490 Pa. 91, 415 A.2d 47.
Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d at 492 n.6, 415 N.E.2d at 942 n.6, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 953 n.6.
Id. at 490, 415 N.E.2d at 941-42, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 952.
Id. at 491-92, 415 N.E.2d at 942, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 953.
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strictive standards for legislative enactments as the Saunders court had
done earlier,23 5 the New York court reasoned that both the civil nature
of the Doe decision along with the Supreme Court's apparent internal
disagreement as to the appropriate application of Doe, evident in the
later Carey decision, 3 6 provided ample justification for distinguishing
its impact from this case.13 7 But, even though these state courts believed that Doe did not preclude a finding that their state sodomy or
sexual deviancy laws were a violation of the fundamental right of personal privacy or- of equal protection of the law, a recent decision from
the federal judiciary has disagreed.
In Dronenburg v. Zech,'" the circuit court of appeals affirmed the
district court's grant of a motion for summary judgment requested by
the Department of the Navy in an action brought by a naval petty
officer to enjoin his discharge from the service because of homosexual
conduct.' 3 9 In responding to the claim that the discharge violated his
constitutional rights to privacy and equal protection of the laws, the
circuit court of appeals, through Judge Bork, held that private, consensual, homosexual conduct is not constitutionally protected."' Citing
Doe, Judge Bork reasoned that a summary affirmance by the Supreme
Court "constitutes a vote on the merits; as such it is binding on lower
Federal courts." ' "' The Court rejected appellant's argument that the
Supreme Court's summary affirmance in Doe was based upon the
plaintiffs' lack of standing because they had not been threatened with
prosecution under the Virginia statute.' 4 ' Judge Bork argued that if
such was the case, the Supreme Court could have so indicated. It did
not. Therefore, he suggested, "we doubt that a Court of Appeals ought
to distinguish a Supreme Court precedent on the speculation that the
Court might possibly have had something else in mind."' 3
But, similar to the state court decisions, the circuit court of appeals offered an extensive analysis of the case law concerning the applicability of a right to privacy to private, consensual, homosexual conduct. Judge Bork's interpretation of Griswold and its progeny was
significantly different than those offered by the highest courts in New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, and New York. Citing a truism for most consti-
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Saunders, 75 N.J. at 216-17, 381 A.2d at 341.
Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 694 (1977) (opinion by Brennan, J.,
in by a plurality).
Onofre, 51 N.Y.2d at 492-93, 415 N.E.2d at 943, 434 N.Y.S.2d at 953.
741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
Id. at 1388-89.
Id. at 1389.
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tutional law scholars and jurists that the right to privacy is not an absolute right, and then distinguishing the privacy cases from homosexual
conduct, Judge Bork reasoned that the Supreme Court has not provided an interpretation which would justify the application of the right
to privacy to homosexual behavior.2 44 The suggestion that this behavior
is "fundamental" or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" was a
conclusion that the Dronenburg court found unacceptable, "unless any
and all private sexual behavior falls within those categories." '24" Apparently because there are no absolute rights in our constitutional scheme
and the grant of constitutional protection to homosexual conduct would
create such a right, they believed any justification for such a protection
is contradictory to our system of rules.
Yet, Judge Bork failed to identify the key element which triggers
the application of the right to privacy; that is, the determination
whether the conduct is harmful to another or to the collective as a
whole. Instead of addressing this question and then applying it to the
facts of the case, the judge described what he believed to be the function of the judiciary as to constitutional interpretation. Admitting that
he had believed prior to his appointment to the federal judiciary that
"no court should create new constitutional rights,'

246

he cited Justice

White's dissenting opinion in Moore v. City of East Cleveland,247 in
which Justice White argued that the Court ought be wary of broad
interpretation of the due process clause. Of particular importance to
Judge Bork was Justice White's forewarning against voiding "legislation. adopted by a State or City to promote its welfare. Whenever the
judiciary does so, it unavoidably pre-empts for itself another part of the
governance of the country without express constitutional authority."'2 48
Drawing support from Justice White's admonition, Judge Bork concluded that, "[ijf the revolution in sexual mores that appellant proclaims is in fact ever to arrive, we think it must arrive through the
moral choices of the people and their elected representatives, not
through the ukase of this Court. 24 9
The Dronenburg court held "frivolous" the appellant's contention
that support for the Navy's administrative rule would endanger all minority protection. 50 Relying on what Judge Bork described as, "constitutional rights that are solidly based in constitutional text and his-
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Id. at 1395.
Id. at 1396.
Id. See also supra note 5.
431 U.S. 494 (1977).
Id. at 544 (White, J., dissenting) (also cited in Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1396).
Dronenburg, 741 F.2d 1388, 1397.
Id.
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tory," 5 1 the court also rejected the argument that majoritarian
morality should be precluded from regulating private sexual intimacy.
Judge Bork confidently cited legislation grounded upon majoritarian
mores which he believed have protected "civil rights, worker safety,
2' 52
[and] the preservation of the environment.
The Dronenburg decision is important for various reasons. Not
only is it the most recent federal judicial analysis of Doe and its significance to the right to be let alone, but even more importantly, the opinion of Judge Bork sharpened the underlying constitutional and jurisprudential issues surrounding the protection of civil rights at this time and
in the foreseeable future. If Judge Bork's interpretation is correct concerning the right to privacy, the apparent unimportance of the "harm"
qualifier in constitutional law, the historical involvement of legislative
bodies as protectors of civil liberties, and the function of our federal
judiciary, the very core of our constitutional democracy may be at risk.
But, it is respectfully submitted that the presumptions upon which
Dronenburg was constructed are inaccurate.
As has been pointed out earlier,2 5 3 the development of the right to
personal autonomy has encompassed individual decisions such as the
acquisition and use of contraceptive devices, 2 " and the performance, of
an abortion.2 55 While it is true that none of these cases have ever indicated that these fundamental decisions are absolute constitutional liberties, the Supreme Court's acceptance of state involvement has been
limited to narrowly drawn governmental intrusion where there is a
showing of a compelling state interest which necessitates restricting the
fundamental individual conduct. This form of state involvement is jurisprudentially and constitutionally sound.25 ' The Dronenburg opinion,
however, fails to examine seriously whether private, consensual, homosexual behavior is conduct which is analogous logically to other forms
of sexual decisions which the Court has deemed to be "fundamental,"
thus necessitating the application of the compelling state interest standard. In this regard, it is totally indefensible to recite segments of Griswold and its progeny which discussed the conduct in question as it related to the relationship of the parties without also indicating that the
fundamentality of the behavior was established because of our historical commitment to governmental nonintervention.157 It has been a basic

251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.

Id.
Id.
See
See
See
See
See

supra notes
supra notes
supra notes
supra notes
Carey, 431

100-48 and accompanying text.
100 & 119.
134-35.
100-48 and accompanying text.
U.S. at 685.

Published by eCommons, 1984

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 10:3

tenet of our system of rules that such intrusion must be justified by a
demonstration of injury. The most disconcerting element of the opinion
is what appears to be a complete disregard for any governmental demonstration that private, adult, consensual, homosexual conduct is in fact
harmful.
Even if we accept the principle that the right to privacy may not
encompass the "right to do as one pleases with one's body," 25' this in
no way justifies Judge Bork's quantum leap of reasoning which restricted the application of the right to privacy to personal decisions
which concern childbearing. 59 Such a narrow reading of the right to
privacy completely ignores the very basis for the constitutional guarantee that intimate personal decisions which provide citizens with the opportunity for self-actualization in matters of sexual relations, and
which cannot be demonstrated to be injurious to another or the collective as a whole, must remain outside the purview of governmental
control.
The justification for such an understanding of the right to be let
alone is, to borrow Judge Bork's own words, "fairly derived by standard modes of legal interpretation from the text, structure, and history
of the Constitution." 6 0 That the "harm" qualifier is an integral part of
our jurisprudential system " ' is easily discernible from the political
philosophical treatises which provided the intellectual catalyst for the
American Revolution. Therefore, to conclude as did Judge Bork that
private, adult, consensual, homosexual conduct is per se outside of the
intended meaning of that which is implicit in the concept of ordered
liberty, and then to reject the need for any demonstration of harm, is
truly inexplicable. Such a conclusion violates the judge's correct demand for objective constitutional decision making. The importance that
has been attached to the right to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into the intimate decisions of Americans requires more
from our judicial system than simply calling upon nonempirical presumptions of so-called "common sense and common experience '"26 to
withold constitutional protection from citizens. Indeed, such a commitment to the maximization of individual liberty is firmly grounded in
our tradition as a people.
But even accepting the unacceptable, that private, adult, consen-
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Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1395.
Id.
Id. at 1396 n.5.
See supra notes 17-21 and accompanying text.
Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1398. Indeed Judge Bork's position seems to be very similar
Sir Patrick Devlin, which was discussed earlier. See supra notes 42-57 and accompany-
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sual, homosexual conduct is not a fundamental right, the Dronenburg
opinion's understanding of what constitutes a rational relationship to a
legitimate governmental objective is ill-conceived. Is it truly rational to
presume that the result of a dissolved sexual relationship will always
result in unprofessional behavior by the jilted party, particularly if this
person is in a position superior to the person who dissolved the relationship? Even presuming that there is evidence to support this presumption, does this justify a regulation which prohibits the type of sexual
relationship, or does it necessitate a prohibition of any unprofessional
coercion by a superior toward a subordinate regardless of sexual orientation? Certainly the overbreadth of the regulation should have been
examined more rigorously.
Yet, the opinion contains another presumption that takes this decision beyond the issue of the scope of the constitutional right to privacy
for homosexual Americans. It assumes that the protection of our civil
liberties properly belongs in our legislative assemblies, particularly our
state legislatures.
If the judiciary is to commit itself to "legal interpretation from the
text, structure, and history of the constitution,"2' 6 3 then there can be
little doubt that such a presumption cannot withstand any "honestly
applied ' '26 4 political, philosophical, legal, or historical analysis of the
American experiment. To construct the issue as accepting majoritarian
democracy or succumbing to judicial oligarchy is simplistic at best and
historically inaccurate at worst. Indeed, acceptance of this depiction of
the powers and relationship of the branches of our federal system
would render the development of national citizenship for all Americans
meaningless. The protection of civil rights for minority Americans, the
standardization of law enforcement procedures, not to mention the numerous protections attendant to the right to privacy, would be legitimately within the political choices of state legislators. The impact of
such an interpretation of our federal system can be discovered with
only a cursory examination of our confederacy period prior to the adoption of the Constitution.""
It is not a distrust of democracy to understand the forewarnings of
the draftsmen of the Constitution and early American constitutional
scholars. As will be remembered, Madison understood the necessity for
majoritarian rule.26 6 But he knew the coequal importance of protecting
"private rights" from legislative assemblies which would act as
the
263. Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1396 n.5.
264. Id.
265. For an excellent analysis of the historical period prior to and including the adoption of
the American Constitution, see G. WooD, supra note 10.
266. See supra notes 22-29.
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"mere instrument of the majority. ' 6 7 Cooley was even more direct
when he wrote that "[a] general law may establish regulations upon
subjects not properly falling within the province of government, and yet
be desired and cheerfully submitted to by the majority. 26 8 It would
therefore not be dishonest to suggest that it has been understood across
our history that unmonitored legislative assemblies may not protect the
fundamental rights of all citizens.
The irony within Judge Bork's opinion is that while he is willing to
qualify his "deference to democratic choice [when] the Constitution
removes the choice from majorities, '2 69 he seems unwilling to really
accept the special role of the federal judiciary in our governmental system to determine when the Bill of Rights precludes majoritarian intrusion. One fears that Judge Bork believes that decisions by the federal
courts, and maybe even the Supreme Court, whose "mode of analysis '"270 is contrary to his or some democratic theorist's reading of our
federal system, cannot withstand the charge that they are usurpations
of the will of the democratic process. If the function of our federal
judiciary is as it appears the Dronenburg decision would suggest, constitutional interpretation will consist of a rigid review of the letter of
our Constitution without consideration of the spirit of the document
and the philosophical values which have underpinned its application
across our history.
V.

CONCLUSION

The constitutional issues surrounding Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney2 71 and its progeny at the state and federal level still remain unanswered. But there are a few developments which ought not be overlooked. The Supreme Court's summary affirmance has produced wide
variances in state and federal court determinations about whether private, adult, consensual, sexual behavior is constitutionally protected.
Depending upon the courage of state court judges, American citizens
may or may not be protected from governmental intrusion into their
intimate decisions concerning sexual relations. What a citizen may believe to be a decision solely within his or her personal domain may be
totally dependent upon the willingness of state legislatures to criminalize sexual conduct between consenting adults. That the void of federal
judicial leadership has resulted in a bizarre patchwork of constitutional
interpretation depending upon the state from which the cause of action
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See Cooley, supra note 30.
Dronenburg, 741 F.2d at 1397.
Id. at 1396 n.5.
403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), affid mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
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arises is not surprising. Indeed, if the Supreme Court continues to remain silent, legislative and judicial confusion will continue and the definition of American citizenship will be subordinated to the political
machinations of state legislatures.
The attainment of civil rights for homosexual Americans is directly related to the continuance of civil rights for heterosexual Americans. Not only do "sexual deviancy" laws often include forms of sexual
conduct in which heterosexuals may choose to participate, but also the
continuance of state intervention into the sanctity of noninjurious sexual behavior legitimizes other forms of intrusion under the guise of
majoritarian morality. This majofitarian morality may have produced
legislation, as Judge Bork pointed out in Dronenburg v. Zech,272 that
protected civil rights, but it has also been the basis for burning witiches,
denying the free exercise of religious conscience, and maintaining slavery. The development of man and his collective governments has been
one of intolerance to those who have been different. If we are to write a
unique chapter in the annals of history, our federal courts cannot abdicate their responsibility to guarantee what has been and can be again
the spirit of America-toleration.

272.

741 F.2d 1348 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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